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Abstract:  
In the paper we present a BOT (Build, Operate, Transfer) model of financing railway infrastructure development in 
the Republic of Slovenia. It is characteristic of this form of project financing that the host country or a local community 
grants a private project company or consortium a concession to build and manage the public infrastructure. By signing the 
concession contract, the concessionaire binds himself/herself to transfer all the property rights from the project back to the 
grantor at the end of the concession period without additional transaction costs at the end of the concession period. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Development of public-private partnerships, including different forms of co-operation between the state 
or local communities and legal entities and natural persons of private sector, has not emerged until an economic 
and  socio-political  environment  enabled  private  companies  to  actively  participate  in  the  implementation  of 
public services and ensured access to public infrastructure had been set up. This refers primarily to the period 
marked by deregulation and by processes of enterprise ownership transformation, which renders possible the 
creation of an institutional framework that allows the implementation of public services to the private sector. 
In professional literature we find different forms of public-private partnerships that can be divided in two 
groups according to the level of private sector participation in the implementation of public services and the 
provision of public infrastructure: (i) various forms of private sector co-operation with the right of ownership to 
a civil or construction engineering object remaining in hands of public sector and only the implementation of 
activity being privatised and (ii) forms of privately managed operations where the right of ownership to the 
object is temporarily or permanently passed over to the private sector. Service performance contracts, public 
infrastructure management contracts, lease contracts and classical concession contracts can be placed into the 
first group, while different forms of partial or total divestiture and different approaches to project financing 
belong to the second group.  
 
2. PROJECT FINANCING 
Project financing represents an off-balance sheet form of providing medium and long-term capital for 
capital intensive projects. This requires a formation of a capital structure, where project assets and cash flow 
will cover all obligations resulting from liabilities. Because of the limited rights of ownership to a civil or 
construction engineering object (that is the outcome of concession relationship), cash flow represents the most 
important  guarantee  for  repayment  of  obligations  resulting  from  liabilities.  That's  why  the  creditors,  when 
establishing  the  concessionary's  debt  capacity,  favour  infrastructural projects that provide a higher level  of 
certainty in the anticipation of future cash flows, while at the same time they are not interested in the debt 
capacity of the sponsors (except if they would guarantee for concessionary's obligations with all their property).  
There is a considerable difference between project and enterprise financing. While with project financing 
the servicing of obligations resulting from liabilities is ensured by project assets and cash flow, in case of 
enterprise and  on-balance sheet  financing these  obligations  are  covered  by the assets and cash flow of the 
enterprise and  not only  by  a single  investment project. However, this is not true, if for the purpose of an 
investment project implementation a new enterprise would be set up. In such a case the value of recognized 
assets  and  liabilities  would  be  equivalent  for  the  enterprise  as  well  as  for  the  contractually  segregated 
infrastructural project. When evaluating the economic acceptability of the infrastructural project feasibility, the 
key decision making factor for potential investors will be the calculation of the project long-term positive net 
cash flow. If a positive cash flow would not be ensured, the profitability of implementation or the project 
implementation should be guaranteed by the state or local community. 
This financing technique can be used only when it is possible to structure single infrastructural projects in 
separate units and transfer them to a private concessionary by granting him a concession for operation and 
maintaining.  We  distinguish  three  basic  forms  of  project  financing:  (i)  non-recourse  project  financing;  (ii) limited-recourse project financing and (iii) full-recourse project financing. With full-recourse form of project 
financing there is no off-balance sheet effect to the recognition of assets and obligations to liabilities. 
Non-recourse project financing is a financing technique, where creditors and other investors have no 
direct or indirect access to project sponsors property ex voto, as they do not guarantee for the repayment of 
obligations  with  all  their  property,  but  only  to  the  amount  of  paid-in  capital  or  to  the  amount  defined  by 
contract. Therefore a future cash flow with a higher risk level requires a higher amount of guarantee or a bigger 
volume of equity capital, which represents the basic guarantee for repayment of obligations resulting from 
liabilities and a base for attaining a positive financial leverage. Financial construction of an investment project 
should be let known to potential investors in advance or they will not be able to come to a decision whether they 
find a project economically acceptable and whether the return on investment is proportional to the risk taken, 
while at the same time in unstable circumstances they would be exposed to a too big risk of bankruptcy. Things 
are utterly different in case of limited-recourse project financing where risks are allocated among individual 
contractors in such a way that a limited guarantee of project sponsors exists for the repayment of obligations 
resulting from liabilities, usually in form of guarantees or by setting aside a fixed amount of sponsor assets to a 
tutorship  account.  With  this  guarantee  project  sponsors  or  third  parties  acting  upon  their  instructions  bind 
themselves to pay a fixed amount to another party should their co-contractor fail to meet his obligations in due 
time. When the instrument of tutorship account is used as a form of guarantee, a sufficient amount of money 
must be remitted to the account for an eventual repayment of unsettled obligations resulting from the investment 
project. 
We can distinguish another two forms of project financing: (i) project financing with the segregation of 
investment project into an ad hoc founded project enterprise (Single Purpose Stock Company or Special Purpose 
Vehicle)  and  (ii)  project  financing  with  a  contractual  segregation  of  the  investment  project,  which 
organisationally remains part of the sponsor as an legal entity, while in contracts (above all in credit contracts) 
limitations  regarding  the  investor's  access  to  sponsor  assets  are  defined  and  all  other  legal  relations  are 
regulated. In project financing an entity of private law enters a concession relation with an entity of public law 
(state or local community). To protect public interest state or local government can limit the legal capacity of a 
concessionary to make new concession contracts and in this manner prevents the encumbrance of net cash flow 
with obligations resulting from other concession relations. Nevertheless, both project financing forms have their 
advantages and weaknesses. Limitation of project enterprise activity can usually lower the risk of contractual 
opportunism, but can not exclude it completely.  
 
3. BOT FORM OF PROJECT FINANCING 
A modern BOT form of project financing was developed in Turkey in the 1980s. It is most frequently 
employed in financing of capital-intensive cross-border projects. The main feature of this form of financing is a 
concession for the construction and maintenance of public infrastructure or other public service facilities granted 
by  the  host  state,  with  the  concessionary  taking  on  the  responsibility  to  provide  all  the  missing  financial 
resources  and  to  transfer  all  rights  of  ownership  resulting  from  the  project  back  to  the  grantor  after  the 
expiration  of  the  concession  period  without  any  additional  transaction  costs.  This  way  the  state  or  local 
community is able to transfer a part of responsibility for financing, construction and maintenance of public 
infrastructure from public to private sector, with private co-contractors being given the possibility to maximize 
the rate of return on invested capital by increasing the operation efficiency [1]. The return on invested capital is 
unlimited upwards (unlimited up-side potential) and represents the most important motive for the participation 
of private investors in public infrastructure development. The objective of participants in project financing is to 
maximize their function of satisfaction. In order to attain this goal, a contractual balance, representing a Pareto 
optimum of contractual relations, must be re-established. To achieve this, a development project agreement is 
required, regulating contractual relations regarding: (i) obligations and rights of project financing participants; 
(ii) provision of financial resources for the construction and maintenance of public infrastructure; (iii) allocation 
of  financial,  technical  and technological,  operational  and other risks; (iv)  measuring of the concessionary's 
operational efficiency and of the quality of public infrastructure maintenance in the operational phase period 
(problem of criteria determination); (v) mode of reimbursement or fining the delays in project implementation; 
(vi) various aid forms given by co-contractors in case the opposite party fails to meet its obligations; (vii) the 
possibility  to  amend  or  modify  the  articles  of  agreement;  (viii)  circumstances  and  ways  for  expansion  or 
dispossession of concession right; and (ix) the way of solving possible disputes among the participants of the 
concession relation. 
The BOT form of project financing involves a temporary privatization of public infrastructure, therefore, 
before signing the concession agreement, the state or local community (principal) must carry out four analyses: 
(i) analysis of public infrastructure and of the level of population provision with public services and goods; (ii) 
analysis of existing mechanisms of regulation; (iii) analysis of the relation of interest groups to the admission of 
private sector to public economic service operations; (iv) analysis of financial and other possibilities for the introduction of public-private partnership. In the opposite case, the missing consent of interest groups to the 
temporary  privatization  of  public  infrastructure  could  put  the  financial  close  or  the  investment  project 
implementation at risk [2]. 
BOT financing technique is employed primarily in those economic activities, where prices of products or 
services are regulated by the state and for this reason the future cash flow can be anticipated with relative 
certainty. When this is not possible, the stability of sales revenues will have to be guaranteed by the state or 
local community. The latter is opposed by many who believe that through aid in different forms of guarantees, 
transfers and subsidies, an aid seeking line of economy (rent seeking industry) starts to grow and finances the X-
inefficiency of the concessionary. This also answers the question why the incorporation of private sector into 
public provision services still does not guarantee greater efficiency in the provision of population with public 
goods. 
 
4. THE FINANCIAL MODEL  
In the last years Slovenia is encountering growing road traffic (mostly transit) and ever sharper requests 
regarding  the  protection  of  space  and  environment  that  represent  new  requirements  and  opportunities  by 
forming the Resolution on the National program of public railway infrastructure development (ReNPPRID). 
According to the proposal of the resolution, we divided the investment program, of which the realization was 
planned  for  the  period  between  2005  and  2020,  to  two  parts,  as  follows:  (i)  the  development  part,  which 
includes investment into upgrading and enlarging of public railway infrastructure, and (ii) regular part, referring 
to implementation of public service and maintenance of existing infrastructure.
1 Since the regular part is going 
to be financed from the state budget, we will be focusing only on the financing of those infrastructure projects, 
that belong in the so called development part and promise considerable quality improvement of railway network 
and transport services. 
The estimated value of investment from the developmental part of the proposal of the resolution amounts 
to 6.22 billion euros, taking into account fixed prices from 2005, with single projects sorted into four basic 
groups, as follows: (i) upgrading of the existing railway infrastructure, (ii) new construction, (iii) construction of 
high  velocity  railway  lines  and  (iv)  project  management  and  preparation  of  project  and  investment 






Table 1: The Investment Structure 
 
  mill €  % 
Upgrading of the existing railway infrastructure  1463  23,5 
New construction  1879  30,2 
High velocity railway lines construction  2300  36,9 
Project management and preparation of project and investment documentation  584  9,4 
Total  6226  100,0 
 
4.1. Organizational viewpoint of the model 
The  financial  model  was  planned  by  taking  into  consideration  the  present  situation  and  long-term 
strategic starting-points for public railway infrastructure development as a BOT form of project financing. From 
the organisational point of view, the investment project is in most cases segregated as an ad hoc founded project 
enterprise, to which later a concession for the implementation and managing of a single project or complete 
investment program is granted by the state or local community.  
The foundation of a project enterprise is logical, especially when hereby debt capacity and possibility for 
project implementation is increased. This was one of the reasons, why along with the development of this 
model, we anticipated a foundation of a segregated investment enterprise (special investment vehicle), whose 
founders should enter an international competition for concession activity. The selected concessionary, be it a 
private consortium or a private enterprise, would be offered a concession contract by the state as a grantor and 
                                                 
1 Taking into account the fixed prices from 2005, the new sum total investment value would be 9.19 billion €.  
2 Taking into consideration the financial burden allocation of particular investment groups, the financially most demanding 
period from the point of view of the complete investment program implementation would be between 2011 and 2017, with 
the two most intensive investment phases in the field of new construction and construction of high velocity railway lines. 
 market regulator. By signing it, the concessionary would contract the obligation to implement a single project or 
a complete investment program and to provide the missing financial resources. In this part of the concession 
relation, the role of a segregated investment enterprise is very important as it enables the transfer of private 
capital into the financial structure of the BOT project implementation. In order to diminish project risks, it is 
desired  for  the  project  enterprise  to  be  organized  as  an  equity  joint  venture,  having  the  right  to  make  an 
outsourcing contract.  
Beside the foundation of a segregated investment enterprise, within the framework of this paper also a 
foundation of a segregated financial fund (special financial purpose vehicle) is suggested. This fund would 
manage the in-flowing means and the payment of annual availability compensations (availability payments) to 
the concessionary. The setting up of a segregated financial fund is logical, primarily to diminish the risk of 
contractual opportunism that could endanger the financial construction and implementation of the project [3]. 
The advantage of a segregated financial fund is displayed in the fact, that the state as the founder has access to 
all important information regarding fund managing and allocation control of financial resources, thus lowering 
the  risk  of  information  asymmetry  and  inadequate  use  of  project  resources  [4].  The  fund  would  also  be 
responsible for checking the concessionary's right to the receipt of annual compensation and a correct use of 
project resources, what is of key importance for a successful implementation of planned investments. With 
regard to the within the framework of the paper anticipated different sources for the pay-out of concession 
payments, such as: revenues originating from usage fees, sources of cross-financing, budgetary funds, etc (see 
Table 2), the foundation of a segregated financial fund would also be important from the harmonizing the 
obligations of potential investors point of view, while the concessionary could focus primarily to the operative 
implementation of infrastructural projects. 
 
Table 2: Financial Fund Resource Structure Projection for the Pay off of Concession Payments 
 
  mill €  % 
National budget funds  1910  28.7 
Sources of cross-financing*  1590  23.9 
Ecological taxes  660  9.9 
Usage fees  2180  32.8 
Revenues resulting from the marketing of other infrastructure  143  2.2 
Other sources**  165  2.5 
Total  6649  100.0 
Notes: (*) e.g. excise taxes, parking fees etc. (**) Lease of telecommunication capacities. 
4.2. Financial viewpoint of the model 
The financial model cash flow simulation is based on the starting points of the preliminary study on the 
possible public railway infrastructure financing models in the Republic of Slovenia and program documentation 
of the Ministry of Transport. Taking into account the assumptions and limitations of railway infrastructure 
financing, the estimated value of the investment and the activation period, the cash flow simulation anticipates a 
concession period of 36 years, coinciding with the concession payment period between 2008 and 2040, during 
which concession payments will be effected from a segregated financial fund on a yearly basis. The pay-off of 
concession payments is frequently linked to the transfer of a long-term concession right to the use of railway 
infrastructure back to the grantor. However, this is not the case with the BOT project financing form as here the 
transfer of ownership rights is effected only after the expiration of the concession period with the exception of 
cases where the principal has the right to buy-back the infrastructure before the expiration of the concession 
period  (early  buy-back)  or  when  they  mutually  agree  to  terminate  the  contract  (early  termination  by 
negotiation). In project financing the timing of ownership rights transfer is very important, as in that moment the 
concessionary loses the right to control cash flow creating resources. 
Taking into consideration the annual estimated values of investments from the program documentation, 
the projection of cash flow etc., between 2008 and 2040 the segregated financial fund should pay-off 6.65 
billion euros of concession payments to a segregated investment enterprise. However, when employing this 
project financing technique, the potential investors must pay a great deal of attention to ensuring the efficiency 
of the received concession payments use or they will run the risk of the project enterprise over-indebtedness. 
That is why an important task of the segregated financial fund would be to control the use of financial resources. 
In addition to ensuring and managing the financial resources, the fund should also take care of the transparency 
and efficiency of use of the in-flowing resources. Another task of the segregated financial fund is to ensure the 
stability of project financing, which displays the fund's capability to substitute the loss of whichever of the 
resources, not allowing it to affect the fulfilment of contractual obligations to the concessionary. In the opposite 
case the loss of one of the resources could endanger the financial stability of the investment implementation, 
anticipated  in  the  cash  flow  projection  and  according  to  which  between  2005  and  2020  the  segregated 
investment enterprise should ensure an additional sum of 2.13 billion euros (see Table 3) in order to bridge the difference  between  obligations  and  liabilities.  Together  with  the  state  the  enterprise  should  also  apply  for 
exploitation of EU funds in the amount of 1.54 billion euros. 
 
Table 3: Investment Enterprise Cash Flow Projection from the Viewpoint of Concession Payments,  
EU Funds and Investment Value 
 
  Investment value  Concession 
payments 
EU funds  Difference 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (2)+(3)-(1) 
Total, 2005-2020, mill €  6223  2554  1538  -2131 
Total, 2005-2040, mill €  6223  6694  1538  2009 
 
Taking into account the cash flow projection, financially the most demanding period for the segregated 
investment enterprise would be between 2014 and 2020. During this period it should cover the total difference 
between the investment value and revenue resulting from concession payments as the exploitation of EU funds 
is  anticipated  only  for  the  period  of  the  next  EU  financial  perspective  2007-2013.  Since  a  successful 
implementation of project financing requires resources to refinance the obligations resulting from liabilities and 
to realize the return on capital invested by private investors, the model simulation anticipates a segregated 
investment enterprise that would be receiving concession payments until the expiration of concession period 
(i.e. to the year 2040), when it would, together with the segregated financial fund, cease to operate. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The financial model presented in this paper, is based on an organisational structure which enables a more 
optimal allocation of financial, technical and technological, operational and other risks that could jeopardize the 
financial  close  and  implementation  of  the  investment  program.  The  main  feature  of  this  structure  is  the 
incorporation  of  three  key  participants:  (i)  state  as  the  grantor  of  concession;  (ii)  a  segregated  investment 
enterprise whose private founders enter an international competition for the implementation and managing of 
the complete investment program and (iii) a segregated financial fund which in the time of concession period 
takes  care  of  managing  the  in-flowing  financial resources (budgetary resources, funds from cross-financing 
sources, ecological taxes, usage fees and funds from other sources) and for the annual availability payments to 
the concessionary, who will use them for the refinancing of obligations resulting from liabilities, including the 
payment of the requested profit rate on equity capital, invested by private investors. 
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